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LEGISLATION
SERVICE-MARK REGISTRATION AND ANTI-DILUTION PROTECTION
IN NEW YORK
Recent amendments to Article 24 of the New York General
Business Law, effective September 1, 1961, have incorporated two
basic and important changes in New York's system of trade-mark
registration.' First, provision is made for the registration of
service-marks which previously were not registrable.2 Secondly,
state registration has been definitively eliminated as a sine qua non
for relief under New York's anti-dilution statute.3 In the following
discussion an attempt will be made to describe the circumstances
which occasioned these developments and to indicate their sig-
nificance for the owners of trade and service-marks.
Service-Marks
In 1953, two bills were presented to the legislature which
sought to create a comprehensive statutory scheme for the registra-
tion and protection of trade-marks. 4  One of these bills, sponsored
by the Joint Legislative Committee on Interstate Cooperation,
contained no provision for the registration of service-marks. 5 The
other, sponsored by the Law Revision Commission, did.6  Both
'N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 360 to 368-e (Supp. 1961).
2 Compare N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 360-62 (Supp. 1961) with N. Y. Sess.
Laws 1954, ch. 628, § 1, as amended.
Section 360, as amended, defines trade and service-marks as follows:
"(a) The term 'trade-mark' means any word, name, symbol or device or
any combination thereof, adopted and used by a person to identify goods
made or sold by him and to distinguish them from goods made or sold by
others.
"(a-i) The term 'service-mark' means anything used in the sale or
advertising of services to identify the services of one person and distinguish
them from the services of others and includes without limitation the marks,
names, symbols, titles, designations, slogans, character names, and distinctive
features of radio or other advertising used in commerce."
3 Compare N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 368-d (Supp. 1961) with N.Y. Sess.
Laws 1955, ch. 453, § 1.
4 See 1953 N.Y.C.B.A. LEG. BuLL. 295-302.5 Id. at 301.
6 Ibid. See also 1953 LEa. Doc. No. 65, N.Y. LAw REVISION COMM'N
REP. (T) 101.
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bills were approved by the Legislature but vetoed by the Governor
with the recommendation that they be consolidated.' However, no
such consolidation was attempted. Rather, in 1954 the bill of
the Committee on Interstate Cooperation was re-introduced and
passed, without any provision for service-mark registration., The
1954 bill was signed by the Governor and is the subject of the
1961 amendments.9
The reasons for the exclusion of service-marks from the statute
seem to have been threefold. The 1954 bill was based on the
United States Trademark Association's Model State Trademark Bill
which also excluded service-marks, and the feeling of the sponsors
of the 1954 bill was that to make service-marks registrable would
tend to militate against the interstate uniformity contemplated
by the Model Bill.10 It was also suggested that the operation
of a registration system encompassing service-marks as well as
trade-marks would create an impractical administrative burden."
Finally, it was considered advisable to study the implications of
service-mark registration in the federal area before attempting
to implement a comparable system on the state level.12
In light of this, owners of service-marks in New York between
1954 and 1961 could obtain registration only under the federal
system. The Federal Trademark Act (Lanham Act) of 1946 made
service-marks registrable, provided, however, that the services rep-
resented by those marks were rendered "in commerce." 13 Al-
though the Lanham Act defines "commerce" as "all commerce
which may lawfully be regulated by Congress," '14 this provision
has been strictly construed. In order to obtain a federal service-
mark registration, it has been necessary that the services actually
be rendered across state lines.15 This approach has been in marked
contrast to the extremely liberal concept of interstate commerce
fashioned by the courts in the area of federal regulation.' 6
Consequently, service-marks have been denied registration under
the federal act in situations involving businesses such as the
7 See N.Y. LEG. ANN. 373 (1953).
8 See 1954 N.Y.C.B.A. LEG. BULL. 239.
9 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1954, ch. 628, § 1, as amended.
10 See 8 TRADEMARK BULL. (n.s.) (March 17, 1953).
111953 LEG. Doc. No. 65, N.Y. LAW REVISION Comm'N REP. (T) 113.
12 Ibid.
'13Trade-Mark Act (Lanham Act) §3, 60 Stat. 429 (1946), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1053 (1958).
14Trade-Mark Act (Lanham Act) §45, 60 Stat. 443 (1946), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1127 (1958).
15 See VANDENBURGH, TRADEMARK LAW AND PROCEDURE 33, 215 (1959).
16See, for-example, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), in which
the Supreme Court held that a farmer's production of wheat for personal
needs had a sufficient effect on interstate commerce to warrant federal control
based on the commerce clause.
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following: (a) a restaurant catering to a clientele which included
many out-of-state customers,'1 7 (b) a ski resort attracting a sizeable
percentage of out-of-state business,' (c) automobile service sta-
tions, servicing vehicles directly engaged in interstate commerce, 19
and (d) home construction companies building homes for residents
of other states.20  The rationale behind this line of cases has been
that although certain superficial aspects of interstate commerce
may have been involved, the services themselves had been rendered
in purely intrastate commerce.
2 1
As a result of this highly restrictive approach, the owners
of service-marks used exclusively in intrastate commerce in New
York were, in many instances, deprived of the benefits of registra-
tion. The 1961 amendment to Article 24 of the General Business
Law permitting the registration of service-marks is intended, in
part, to fill this vacuum created by the narrow interpretation of
the Lanham Act discussed above. Since trade-marks and service-
marks differ only circumstantially as to scope of designation (one
being applied to goods, the other to services), a determination
of the effect of registration upon common-law rights in service-
marks can be made by way of analogy with the corresponding effect
of registration upon rights in trade-marks, which has been observable
on the state level in New York since 1954. With this in mind,
it is possible to describe accurately the probable implications of
service-mark registration.
'7 x parte Bookbinder's Restaurant, 103 U.S.P.Q. 274 (Comm'r Pats.
1954), aff'd, 112 U.S.P.Q. 326 (C.C.P.A. 1957).Is Ex parte The Aspen Co., 107 U.S.P.Q. 238 (Comm'r Pats. 1955).1 9Ex parte The Standard Oil Co., 92 U.S.P.Q. 259 (P.O. Ch. Exam.
1952).2 0 LEX parte Thomas Plantone & Sons, Inc., 115 U.S.P.Q. 355 (Comm'r
Pats. 1957); Ex parte Bayberry, 111 U.S.P.Q. 189 (Comm'r Pats. 1956).
The applicant for registration in the Bayberry case, a builder of residential
homes in New York, was, in addition, subject to regulation under the VA
and the FHA banking laws. Nevertheless, it was held that he was not
engaged in "commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress."
See Trade-Mark Act (Lanham Act) § 45, 60 Stat. 443 (1946), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1127 (1958).21 See, e.g., Ex parte Bookbinder's Restaurant, 103 U.S.P.Q. 274 (Comm'r
Pats. 1954), aff'd, 112 U.S.P.Q. 326 (C.C.P.A. 1957); Ex parte Parichy
Bloomer Girls, Inc., 110 U.S.P.Q. 247 (Comm'r Pats. 1956); Ex parte
The Aspen Co., 107 U.S.P.Q. 239 (Comnm'r Pats. 1955).
In Aspen, the Commissioner stated: "The record clearly shows that
whatever services are rendered by this applicant are rendered within the
State of Colorado, after the interstate journeys of its visitors have ended
when they disembark at the railroad station, airport, or other place in
Aspen." Ex parte The Aspen Co., supra at 241. In Bookbinder, it was
held: "[T]he service is performed, or rendered, in a restaurant located in
Philadelphia, which lies within the single State of Pennsylvania, irrespective
of the places from which the customers come." Ex parte Bookbinder's
Restaurant, supra at 274-75.
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Registration under the New York statute does not in any way
affect substantive common-law rights in marks.2 2 The common-law
principle of priority of use is not altered by the fact of registration.23
An individual acquires no substantive rights by registering a
mark which he did not possess previously. Although it is true
that state registration may be of certain evidential value,24 the
primary significance of a registration procedure is that, functioning
properly, it furnishes a convenient and centralized source of
reference and provides notice of existing common-law rights in
marks.25
The case of Victory Chain, Inc. v. Rosenberg2  illustrates
the point very effectively. Although a trade name was involved
there, such a name seemingly would be registrable today as a
service-mark under the amended provisions of Section 360 of the
General Business Law.27 The defendant in this case acting entirely
in good faith, opened a grocery store business and used the trade
name "Victory." In 1942 the store grossed $65,000 and had
an advertising budget of about $3,000. By 1957 the defendant's
store had become a modern supermarket with an annual projected
gross of $1,800,000 and an advertising budget of approximately
$48,000. In the end, it appeared that the plaintiff, a large super-
market chain, had actually used the name "Victory" more than
twenty years prior to its adoption by the defendant and there-
fore had the better common-law right. As a result, an injunction
was issued against the defendant's further use of the name in his
business.
This outcome, although distasteful to the court, was inevitable.
Yet, had the defendant been able to ascertain the existence of
a prior right to the name "Victory" in 1942, he could have
regulated his initial choice accordingly and thus avoided the serious
loss of his commercial good will which it took him fifteen years
22N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §368-d (Supp. 1961). See DERENBFRG, TRADE-
MARK PROTECTION AND UNFAIR TRADING 468-83 (1936).
23 See VANDENBURGH, TRADEMARK LAW AND PROCEDURE 42 (1959).
24Although state registration is always subject to prior common-law
rights, it gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of validity which can be of
importance where problems of proof exist. The probative value of state
registration, however, is at times considerably less than that of federal
registration. Codipare DERENBERG, op. cit. supra note 22, at 482 wuith 4
CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARXS 2072-73 (2d ed.
1950).
25 See 1961 N.Y.C.B.A. LEG. BULL. 429.
26 10 Misc. 2d 382, 174 N.Y.S.2d 46 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
27 Trade names as such are not registrable but may comply with the
provisions of section 360 which define "service-mark" so as to include
"anything used in the sale or advertising of services to identify the services
of one person and distinguish them from the services of others. . ....
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §360 (a-i) (Supp. 1961).
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to acquire. The plaintiff would also have profited by being able
to forego the time and expense of a court action and the ever-
present danger of an unfavorable outcome.
Service-mark registration is significant precisely because it is
calculated to prevent such occurrences.' 8 The individual who in
good faith contemplates the adoption of a certain mark has a
vital interest in being able to ascertain its availability. Of course,
the feasibility of state registration as a preventive device will directly
depend upon the willingness of the business community to register
its marks on a wide scale and a general awareness, on the part
of general practitioners, of the necessity and desirability of registering
a client's mark. Although compulsory registration is undesirable
because of its possible abuses,20 apathy toward registration can be
expected to be minimal, since the enlightened businessman is
well aware of the advisability of making known his rights to others.
Staying out of court can be a compelling practical consideration.
Dilution
The predecessor to section 368-d read as follows:
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive
quality of a trade name or trade-mark shall be a ground for injunctive
relief in cases of trade-mark infringement or unfair competition, notwith-
standing the absence of competition between the parties or the absence of
confusion as to the source of goods or services.30
Section 368-d, as amended, now provides:
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive
quality of a mark or trade name shall be a ground for injunctive relief in
cases of infringement of a mark registered or not registered or in cases of
unfair competition, notwithstanding the absence of competition between
the parties or the absence of confusion as to the source of goods or
services.31
28 1n addition to New York, eleven other states have adopted provisions
for service-mark registration. CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 141-1-1 to -2 (1953) ;
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 140 §§ 8-10 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1960); INn. ANN. STAT.
§§ 66-131 to -133 (Supp. 1960); MINx. STAT. ANN. §§ 333.18-.20 (Supp.
1960); N.M. ST!.v. ANN. § 49-4-7 (Supp. 1961); OHIo REv. CoDE ANN.§§ 1329.54-.56 (Baldwin Supp. 1960) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 78 §§ 21-23 (Supp.
1960); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 12-16 (1960); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 70-3-1 to -4 (1953); VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 59-189.3 to .7 (Supp. 1960);
,VAsH. R'v. CODE §§ 19.77.010-.040 (Supp. 1957).
20Were registration compulsory, unregistered marks, though valid at com-
mon law, would become public property which could be appropriated by
the first to obtain a valid registration. Fraud and deception would likely
result from such a system. See DERENBERG, op. cit. supra note 22, at 23-24
& n.89.
30 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1955, ch. 453, § 1.
31 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 368-d (Supp. 1961) (emphasis added).
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The amended version extends the operation of the statute so as
to include service-marks as well as trade-marks. 32 Therefore, what
will be said concerning the doctrine of dilution generally and its
effect upon rights in trade-marks will be applicable to service-
marks as well. In addition, section 368-d now expressly states
that marks will be entitled to protection against dilution irrespective
of registration. In order to understand the implications of this
latter provision, it is necessary to consider the general development
of the dilution concept and the recent circumstances which
prompted legislative action in this area.
Traditionally, in order to make out a case in trade-mark in-
fringement it was necessary to establish the existence of con-
fusion or likelihood of confusion, i. e., that a defendant's use of
plaintiff's mark had resulted or was calculated to result in a
misconception on the part of the public as to the source or origin
of the goods in question. 33  This view, which conceived of the
trade-mark as a designation of source or origin of goods, con-
templated the protection of the public against deception rather
than the safeguarding of property rights in marks per se.34
In 1927, it was suggested that the uniqueness of certain so-
called "strong" marks justified trade-mark protection based on
the preservation of independent property rights.35 According to
Dr. Schechter, who introduced the dilution theory in the United
States, 38 certain fanciful and distinctive marks surpass the tradi-
tional function of identification of origin and reflection of com-
mercial good will, and attain an intrinsic value of their own based
on selling power.37  Since the worth of such marks is rooted in
their distinctiveness and singularity, it was proposed that pro-
tection might be extended to them, regardless of whether or not
confusion or competition might be found, where selling power
was threatened by deterioration of the marks' uniqueness (diltition)
through use on non-competing goods. 38  From 1932 onward, the
decisional law of New York has been characterized by an apparent
3 Section 368-d provides protection against dilution of a "mark" which
action of an interloper in seeking to use the same mark or trade name in a
3 See VANDENBURGH, op. cit. supra note 23, at 102-16.3 See DERENBERG, TRADE-MARK PROTECrION AND UNFAIR TRADING 47-55
(1936).
3 See Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARv.
L. REv. 813 (1927).
36 See Middleton, Some Aspects of Trademark Dilution, 47 TRADEMARK
REP. 1023 (1957).
37 See Schechter, supra note 35, at 813-19.
38 See Callmann, Unfair Competition Without Competition?, 37 TRADE-
MARK REa'. 175 (1947). Dilution has been defined as the "eventual loss
of the distinctive quality of a valuable mark or trade name caused by the
action of an interloper in seeking to use the same mark or trade name in a
non-competing business." 1961 N.Y.C.B.A. LEG. BuLL. 430.
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assimilation of the dilution doctrine, although, as will be pointed
out, this process has not as yet culminated in outright adoption.3 9
In 1954 New York became the third state to adopt an. anti-
dilution statute.40
The next major development in this area was the holding
of Dawn Donut Co. v. Harts Food Stores, Inc.,41 which directly
led to the statute's revision in 1961.42 The plaintiff in this action
was a nationwide wholesale distributor of doughnut mixes under
the trade-marks "Dawn" and "Dawn Donut." These marks had
been registered under the Lanham Act and plaintiff customarily
licensed retail dealers throughout the country to use its marks
in connection with sales of products made from its mixes. Although
no such licenses had been granted in New York on the retail
level, plaintiff was engaged in the wholesale distribution of its
mixes throughout the state. Defendant, which operated a retail
grocery chain in New York had sold doughnuts under the trade-
mark "Dawn" since 1951, apparently in good faith. In denying
injunctive relief, the Second Circuit took the position that, al-
though defendant, as junior user, could acquire no rights in'plain-
tiff's mark since registration under the Lanham Act 'constituted
constructive notice of plaintiff's prior claim, no likelihood of con-
fusion was shown to exist as a result of defendant's use.43  It was
pointed out, however, that upon plaintiff's commencement of bus-
iness on the retail level in New York, further use of its mark
by defendant would be enjoined. 44  For purposes of this discussion
the case is significant because of its interpretation of the New York
anti-dilution statute, upon which the plaintiff relied secondarily
and which would have entitled it to injunctive relief despite the
court's finding that no likelihood of confusion existed. , In this
connection Judge Lumbard stated:
39 The question of protection against dilution was first considered in New
York in Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Prods., Inc., 147 Misc. 679, 264 N.Y.
Supp. 459 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 237 App. Div. 801, 260 N.Y. Supp. 821 (1st
Dep't 1932) (per curiam), aff'd nwi., 262 N.Y. 482, 188 N.E. 30 (1933).
Although the court seemed to rest its decision on a finding of dilution, there
was evidence of actual "confusion" in the case. The same appears to be
true today. See, e.g., Greyhound Corp. v. Greyhound Securities, Inc., 26
Misc. 2d 303, 207 N.Y.S2d 742 (Sup. Ct. 1960); James Burrough, Ltd. v.
Ferrara, 8 Misc. 2d 819, 169 N.Y.S.2d 93 (Sup. Ct. 1957). See also
Middleton, supra note 36, at 1027.
40 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1954, ch. 628, § 1, as amended. Anti-dilution statutes
are currently in force in four states: Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts and
New York. See 1961 N.Y.C.B.A. LEG. BULL. 430.
41267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959).42See 1961 N.Y.C.B.A. LEG. BULL. 430-31.43 Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 365 (2d
Cir. 1959).S4Ibid.
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Section 368-c of New York's General Business Law [the predecessor to the
current section 368-d] may provide relief against dilution of a trade-
mark but plaintiff has not registered its mark in New York and the first
sentence of §368-c limits protection therein provided to owners of marks
registered under New York law. Plaintiff is therefore remitted to his
common-law rights.4 5
The adoption by the court of this view, which made the
applicability of the New York anti-dilution statute contingent upon
prior registration within the state, seems to have departed com-
pletely from the apparent position of the New York courts. The
latter, in construing the statute, consistently disregarded registration
as a factor of any significance.4 6 In some instances, an opinion
might state that a plaintiff's mark had been registered under the
federal act,47 but at no time, it would seem, was mention made
of state registration nor did the outcome turn upon the presence
or absence of. registration of any kind.48 The correctness of this
approach becomes further apparent from a consideration of the
statute's legislative history.
4 9
Indeed, if we may assume that this legislation was merely a
codification of already existing common law, it is difficult to com-
prehend what relevancy the fact of registration could have. In
this regard, it would appear that New York's anti-dilution statute
was never intended to be any more than a codification. 50 judge
Lumbard seems to discount the idea that dilution existed in
45 Id. at 366.
46See United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc. v. Amtex Fabrics, Inc., 29 Misc.
2d 86, 212 N.Y.S.2d 498 (Sup. Ct. 1961); James Burrough, Ltd. v. Ferrara,
8 Misc. 2d 819, 169 N.Y.S.2d 93 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Renofab Process Corp.
v. Renotex Corp., 158 N.Y.S.2d 70 (Sup. Ct. 1956); International Latex
Corp. v. Revlon Prods., 3 Misc. 2d 487, 148 N.Y.S.2d 304 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
In addition, in two recent cases involving the 1955 version of the statute,
plaintiff was given relief although a non-registrable trade name was involved.
Greyhound Corp. v. Greyhound Securities, Inc., 26 Misc. 2d 303, 207 N.Y.S.2d
742 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Victory Chain, Inc. v. Rosenberg, 10 Misc. 2d 382,
174 N.Y.S.2d 46 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
47 See, e.g., Vaudable v. Montmartre, Inc., 20 Misc. 2d 757, 193 N.Y.S.2d
332 (Sup. Ct. 1959); International Latex Corp. v. Revlon Prods., 3 Misc.
2d 487, 148 N.Y.S.2d 304 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
48 See note 46 supra.
49 See N.Y. LEG. ANN. 49 (1954). "The proposed bill has nothing to
do with registration; it should not affect any presently existing legislation
or be connected in any way with other trade-mark bills now pending. We
take no position on such other legislation, considering the proposed 'dilution'
bill as a subject all its own." Id. at 50-51.
50ld. at 49. The dilution bill was here referred to as one "to codify
the State common law concerning dilution of trade-marks." See Fancee
Free Mfg. Co. v. Fancy Free Fashions, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 825, 829-30
(S.D.N.Y. 1957); Renofab Process Corp. v. Renotex Corp., 158 N.Y.S.2d
70 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
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New York as part of the common law of unfair competition.51
Yet, if it does exist at all it would appear inconsistent to attribute
its efficacy to state registration which supposedly does not affect
substantive trade-mark rights in any way.5 2  Furthermore, it
should be noted that the prior version of the current section 368-d
provided for relief against "dilution of the distinctive quality of a
trade name or trade-mark. . . . , 53 If the section extended only
to registered marks as Dawn Donut held, it would seem to follow
that trade names could never be protected against dilution since
they are not registrable.5 Although the court's conclusion finds
some support in the highly technical rationale of the opinion, the
result would seem to have been clearly incompatible with New
York law.5 5 The speedy enactment of section 368-d seems indicative
of this fact.
An attempt to evaluate the significance of this amendment on
the state level poses a broader question regarding the development
of the dilution concept in general. It has been suggested that an
examination of the decisional law in the dilution area from Tiffany
& Co. v. Tiffany Prods., Inc.58 to the present, including cases
since 1954 construing New York's anti-dilution statute, will sug-
gest that dilution has not, in fact, become part of our trade-mark
law, despite the lip service paid by the courts to the concept.5 7
It would appear that the courts have not found dilution except
where likelihood of confusion was also present.58 However, it
51 Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., supra note 43, at 366.
52 If the right to protection against dilution is contingent upon state
registration, then the latter creates a substantive right which did not exist
at common law. Such a result was clearly beyond the scope of New
York's registration statute. See 1954 N.Y.C.B.A. LEG. BULL. 238.
5 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1955, ch. 453, § 1 (emphasis added).
5' The 1954 version of Article 24 of the General Business Law contained
no provision for the registration of trade names. Although the 1961
amendments effect no change in this regard, a definition of the term
"trade name" has been incorporated into section 360(a-iii). Possibly, the
reason for this is the reference made to "trade name" in section 368-d.
a5 See text accompanying note 45 supra. Professor Derenberg has char-
acterized the interpretation of New York's anti-dilution statute in Dawn
Donut as "disturbing." See Derenberg, The Twelfth Year of Administration
of The Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 49 TRADEMARK REP. 1019, 1073
(1959).
56 147 Misc. 679, 264 N.Y. Supp. 459 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 237 App. Div. 801,
260 N.Y. Supp. 821 (1st Dep't 1932) (per curiam), aff'd'mem., 26? N.Y.
482, 188 N.E. 30 (1933).
57 See Middleton, Some Reflections On Dilution, 42 TRADEMA RiK REI. 175,
187 (1952) ; Middleton, Some Aspects of Trademark Dilution, 47 TRADEMARK
REP. 1023, 1031 (1957).
58 See Derenberg, The Problem of Trademark Dilution and the Anti-
dilution, Statutes, 44 CALIF. L. Rev. 439, 451 (1956). It would seem that
the New York cases after 1956 have continued this trend. See Greyhound
Corp. v. Greyhound Securities, Inc., 26 Misc. 2d 303, 207 N.Y.S.2d 742
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does not necessarily follow that the dilution doctrine is an empty
form. 9 In fact, the steadily increasing facility of the courts for
finding likelihood of confusion in cases involving non-competing
goods may well be explainable as a reaction to the dilution prin-
ciple.6 0  It is true that the courts have not yet overcome their
reluctance toward accepting dilution at face value."' Nevertheless,
the traditional tests have been extended to cope with the so-called
"unfair competition without competition" situation originally con-
templated by the dilution theory,6 2 'and the increasing tendency
toward enlargement of the "confusion" standard would seem to
indicate 'an eventual unqualified adoption of the dilution theory. 3
Section 368-d speeds the process by foreclosing the possibility of a
future adoption of Judge Lumbard's holding by the New York
courts.
The dilution theory has never been incorporated into the
federal system-although at one time its adoption was considered.6 4
With regard to infringement, the Lanham Act follows the tradi-
tional common-law test of confusion. 5  However, relief has at
times been sought in the federal courts on the basis of state
anti-dilution legislation. In this way, the New York statute
several times became the subject of interpretation by federal
(Sup. Ct. 1960); Vaudable v. Montmartre, Inc., 20 Misc. 2d 757, 193
N.Y.S.2d 32 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Victory Chain, Inc. v. Rosenberg, 10 Misc.
2d 382, 174 N.Y.S.2d 46 (Sup. Ct. 1958); James Burrough, Ltd. v. Ferrara,
8 Misc. 2d 819, 169 N.Y.S.2d 93 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
59 See Derenberg, supra note 58, at 451.6 0 Mr.. Middleton has suggested that the constantly expanding confusion
doctrine hag been used by the courts as a device for steering clear of "this
strange and hybrid thing called dilution." Middleton, Some Aspects of
Trademark Dilution, supra note 57, at 1033. If this is true, it would appear
that the dilution principle has been an important factor in the development
of New York's trade-mark law, rather than an alien concept of little
significance.
61 But see United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc. v. Amtex Fabrics, Inc.,
29 Misc. 2d 86, 212 N.Y.S.2d 498 (Sup. Ct. 1961). The court in con-
struing the New York anti-dilution statute stated: "[T]he defendant's con-
tention that . . . no confusion can arise, even if correct, in its assumptions,
is neither determinative nor persuasive." Id. at 87, 212 N.Y.S.2d at 500.
The usual finding of some degree of confusion seems to be lacking here.
62 See Callmann, Unfair Competition Without Competition?, 37 TRADE-
MARx REP. 175 (1947).
63It does not seem unlikely that the approach of "extend[ing] the
penumbra of the plaintiff's mark until it embraces the field of the de-
fendant's activity," and thereby finding "confusion," will ultimately be
replaced by the more direct procedure afforded by a literal application of
section 368-d. Middleton, Some Aspects of Trademark Dilution, supra
note 57, at 1033.
64 See Derenberg, supra note 58, at 449-50.
65Trade-Mark Act (Lanham Act) §§2(d), 32(1), 60 Stat. 428, 438
(1946),. 15 U.S.C §§ 1052(d), 1114(1) (1958).
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courts.6 6  As on the state level, a basic reluctance toward unqualified
acceptance of the dilution doctrine has been apparent. Despite
the plain language of the New York anti-dilution statute, its
application was, in effect, made contingent upon the existence of
some degree of confusion.6 7  In the Dawn Donut case the court
did not resort to this device but instead relied on the registration
requirement.
Now that state registration has been eliminated as a test, the
dilution principle will likely become an increasingly important
factor in federal trade-mark litigation. Whereas the New York
state courts, in which infringement actions are seemingly more
limited in scope,68 have found it possible, in effect, to give relief
against dilution in terms of traditional theories, the Dawn Donut
case is a possible indication that in similar situations in the
federal area the confusion standard may not prove quite so
flexible. This would appear to be so where the holder of a
federal registration attempts to protect his mark against a purely
intrastate user far removed from the registrant's projected com-
petitive area. Assuming that the tendency of Dawn Donut in
this regard remains unchanged,6 9 applicable state anti-dilution
statutes apparently will present the most logical basis for relief in
these situations. It seems highly probable that the federal courts
will strongly resist any effective application of these state statutes.
A possible device for doing so was suggested by Judge Lumbard
in Dawn Donut when he stated that even absent the necessity for
state registration, plaintiff's mark did not possess the "well estab-
lished secondary meaning" 70 which protection against dilution would
require. It remains to be seen what attitude the federal courts
will in fact adopt.
66 See, e.g., Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc. v. Nifty Foods Corp., 266 F2d
541 (2d Cir. 1959); Wyatt Earp Enterprises, Inc. v. Sackman, Inc., 157
F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
67 See, e.g., Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 167 F. Supp.
427 (N.D.N.Y. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 271 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1959);
Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch Co.,
155 F. Supp. 932, 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (dictum), modified, 260 F.2d 637
(2d Cir. 1958).
6sMore often than not both parties in a trade-mark infringement action
in a state court will be doing business within the state. In the federal
courts, on the other hand, the parties frequently are engaged in business
in different states. As a result, one might expect that the state courts
would experience less difficulty in making a finding of possible confusion
between competing marks.
69The court's finding of no possibility of confusion and the consequent
denial of relief have been criticized as "startling and almost unprecedented.
." Derenberg, The Twelfth Year of Administration of The Lanham
Trademtrk Act of 1946, 49 TRADEMAR-K REP. 1019, 1070 (1959).7 0 Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 366 (2d
Cir. 1959).
1961 ]
198 ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [VOL. 36
Conclusion
The recent changes incorporated into the General Business
Law constitute a salutary development in New York's trade-mark
law. In the first place, the practical benefits of state registration
have been made accessible to the owners of service-marks used
exclusively in intrastate commerce. And in the dilution area, New
York law has been clarified by the elimination of state registration
as a prerequisite for relief under the anti-dilution statute. The
implications of service-mark registration would seem to be reason-
ably well-defined but the impact of section 368-d remains some-
what conjectural. Although on both the state and federal level
it does remove the possibility of an adoption of Judge Lumbard's
interpretation of the New York anti-dilution statute, it remains
unclear to what extent the statute may prove a basis for relief
in the state or federal courts.
